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NO PREEMPTION OF LABOR LAW BY FEDERAL MARITIME LAW 
Federal Maritime Law does not preempt plaintiff's claim under New York 
Labor Law§§ 200, 240(1) and§ 241(6) establishing general duty to protect 
health and safety of employees, and requiring reasonable and adequate safety 
protections for construction, evacuation and demolition work. 
Cammon v. City of New York, et. al. 
95 N.Y.2d 583 
(Decided December 21, 2000) 
Plaintiff Willie Cammon, a foreman dock builder, was injured while repairing 
a wood fender system at the South Bronx Transfer Station, also known as the Hunts 
Point Sanitation Department Transfer Station. The injury occurred while plaintiff was 
working from a float stage in navigable waters that was secured to the land based 
transfer station. Specifically, plaintiff was cutting timber from the bulkhead. While 
working on the timber a passing tugboat created turbulence that moved the crane bar 
and float stage. The timber came loose and subsequently struck, plaintiffs head and 
body. 
New York City ("the City") owns and operates the Marine Transfer Station 
and contracted with defendant, general contractor, Anjac Enterprises, Inc. ("Anjac") 
to repair stmctures at the facility. Anjac subcontracted the pier-repair to third-party 
defendant Macro Enterprises, LTD., ("Macro") plaintiffs employer. Macro agreed 
"to perform all work . . .  strictly in conformance and compliance with all laws, rules, 
regulations, ordinances and statutes in force in the locality in which the work is 
located. As a construction worker "engaged in maritime employment" (33 U.S.C.A. 
§ 902(3)) plaintiff qualified and received compensation and medical benefits under 
the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act ("LHWCA") (33 U.S.C.A. § 
90 I et seq). 
Plaintiff commenced this action in Supreme Court, alleging violations of State 
Labor Law §§  200, 240(1) and 241 (6) against the City and Anjac. Anjac asserted a 
third-party complaint against plaintiffs employer Macro, seeking contribution and 
indemnification. 
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The City and Anjac moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint 
upon the ground that federal maritime law preempts New York Labor Law. In the 
alternative, defendants moved for summary judgment on their contractual and 
common law indemnification claims against third-party defendant Macro. Plaintiff 
cross-moved for partial summary judgment on liability on his Labor Law § 240( I )  
and § 241 (6) claims. Supreme Court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment to the extent of dismissing the complaint and denied plaintiffs cross 
motion. 
The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the complaint, holding that 
federal maritime law did not preempt plaintiff 's Labor Law causes of act ion. The 
Appellate Division subsequently granted the defendants and third-party defendant 
leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals and certif ied the following question: "[ w ]as 
the order of this Court, which reversed the order of the Supreme Court, properly 
made?'' The Court of appeals, Smith, J . , held that, under the circumstances presented 
plaintiffs Labor Law claims are not preempted. Af irmed. 
Defendants and third party defendants maintain that federal maritime law 
should apply to the exclusion of plaintiff's claims. Maritime law does not generally 
impose liability without actual proof of negligence. Alternatively, New York Labor 
Law § 240( I), however, imposes strict liability upon an owner or contractor. Zimmer 
v. Chemung Cowzty Pe1jorming Arts, 65 N. Y.2d 513( 1985). Thus, plaintiff would 
have to show actual negligence on the part of the defendants. In support of their 
contention, that to impose state liability standards where admiralty jurisdiction exists 
would disrupt the uniformity of federal maritime law, defendants rely on the First 
Department case, Tibak v. City of New York, 546 N.Y.S.2d 602 (!51 Dept. 1 985). "In 
that case (unlike this case), the First Department determined that plaintiffs Labor 
Law claims were superseded by federal admiralty law, and held that "the rights and 
liabilities of the parties under the general maritime law cannot be enlarged or 
impaired by state statute.l.Q_, at 602. Defendants also argue that the Second 
Department has similarly held with respect to Labor Law § 240 in Erikson v. Long Is. 
Light. Co. , 653 N.Y.S.2d 670 (2d Dept. 1997) and Rigopoulos v. State of New York, 
653 N.Y.S.2d 667 (2d Dept. 1997). 
Plaintiff argues that federal maritime law does not preempt his Labor Law 
claims because there is no federal law or interest directly impacted by its 
implementation. Consequently, plaintiff contends, uniformity of maritime law would 
not be affected by allowing State law claims in this case. Paramount to plaintiffs 
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argument is the interest that New York has in regulating safe construction practices 
within its borders and there is a presumption against restricting exercise of its police 
powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens. 
Judge Smith clarifies, that the fact that federal maritime law is involved does 
not necessarily mean that State law is superseded. Although, it remains unclear the 
extent to which State courts may apply their substantive law to maritime cases, there 
are a number of factors to consider including: whether the State rule conflicts with 
federal law; hinders uniformity; makes substantive changes; or interferes with the 
characteristic features of maritime law or commerce. 
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of the applicability of procedural 
state law in maritime actions. In Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921), 
the Court held that a widow of a maritime worker killed i n  California territorial waters 
could bring a wrongful death action in admiralty. The Court reasoned: "[t]he subject 
matter is marit ime and local in character and the . . .  supplement to the rule appl ied in 
maritime courts . . . will not work mater ial prejudice to the characteristics of general 
maritime law." 
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court again appl ied the so called "marit ime 
but local" rule where a carpenter's injury occurred on navigable waters. Grant Smith­
Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde. 257 U.S. 469 (1922). The Court concluded that State 
compensat ion law should apply, stat ing that "as to certain local matters regulation of 
which would work no material prejudice to the general maritime law, the rules of the 
latter might be mod i fied or supplemented with state statues." Jd. at 477. 
The Court in th is case reasoned, given the fact that plaintiffs theory of 
liability arose under New York Labor Law, that the protection of workers engaged in 
maritime activities is a concern of federal maritime law. Consequently, this case is 
unlikely to disrupt general maritime law principles by the application of a state law 
liability statute. "State application of strict l iabil ity here will not unduly interfere with 
the federal interest in maintain ing the free flow of maritime commerce." 
New York's Labor Law is a local statute enacted to protect the health and 
safety of workers. Thus, an important local concern is at issue in the resolution of this 
issue of preemption. Application of the doctrine of "maritime but local" establishes 
that under these circumstances where the tort was maritime but local and there are no 
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far-reaching implications that may undermine general maritime principles, New York 
Labor Law is applicable even though it applies strict liability. 
The lengthy dissent by Judge Rosenblatt, joined by Judge Levine, argued that 
maritime law preempts Labor Law § 240( I ), therefore dissenting in part. The 
dissenters point out that the construction work and the cause of the injury (passing 
tug) have a substantial connection to maritime activity. The thrust of the dissent 
hinges on the proposition that there is an irreconcilable conflict between Labor Law § 
240( I )  and maritime law. That "under Labor Law § 240( I ), an injured workers 
contributory negligence does not reduce a defendant's liability, but under maritime 
law it does. Thus, this conflict, the dissent argues, has direct implications on the 
administration of maritime law and recovery under maritime law. 
George Schwab IV 
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10 
